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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 11-3743 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JORGE OMAR LOPEZ-ALFARO  
also known as 
JORGE OMAR LOPEZ 
also known as 
JORGE AGUILAR 
also known as 
GEORGE CARCAMO 
 
       Jorge Omar Lopez-Alfaro, 
 
          Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-09-00735-001) 
Honorable Juan R. Sanchez, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 2, 2012 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Filed: October 3, 2012) 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge
 This matter comes on before this Court on an unusually narrow appeal by 
appellant Jorge Omar Lopez-Alfaro from a judgment of conviction and sentence dated 
September 26, 2011, entered pursuant to his plea of guilty in this criminal case.  The 
District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
. 
 The background of the case is as follows.  Lopez-Alfaro, a native of Mexico who 
was in this country illegally, pled guilty in a state court in Florida to a charge of 
attempted first degree murder.  The Florida court sentenced him to a six-year custodial 
term, but apparently because the court anticipated that he would be removed from the 
country after he was released it did not impose any type of supervisory term to follow 
Lopez’s release following his service of his custodial term.  In fact, he was removed from 
this country on or about August 11, 2005, following the completion of his custodial term. 
 Subsequently, Lopez-Alfaro reentered this country illegally and the Philadelphia 
police arrested him for various state offenses.  The state court, however, released him 
pending the state court proceedings but federal immigration agents then arrested him 
because of his illegal status in this country.  This federal arrest led to his indictment in the 
District Court for unlawful reentry contrary to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2).  He 
pleaded guilty to this offense and the Court sentenced him within the statutory and 
guideline ranges to a 47-month custodial term to be followed by a three-year term of 
supervised release.  The state court charges have been dismissed. 
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 Lopez-Alfaro appeals, contending only that his term of supervised release was 
unlawful because the District Court imposed it as a punishment for his offense of 
unlawfully reentering the country even though a term of supervised release cannot be 
imposed as a punishment.  He acknowledges, however, that even though the Court 
explained why it was imposing the term of supervised release, he did not object to the 
imposition of the term in that Court.  Consequently, we review the sentence for plain 
error, see United States v. Maurer, 639 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2011), but that review 
encompasses an exercise of plenary review to the extent that Lopez-Alfaro contends that 
the Court erred as a matter of law in imposing the term of supervised release.  See United 
States v. Wise
 Lopez-Alfaro correctly sets forth the law underlying the reasons for the imposition 
of a term of supervised release but the problem with his appeal is that the District Court 
imposed the sentence of supervised release for appropriate statutory reasons.  Therefore, 
the Court did not plainly err, or err at all, in imposing the term. 
, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 As the government points out, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sets forth the factors that a 
district court should consider in imposing a sentence.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(c), in turn, 
incorporates the factors for a court to consider in determining whether to impose a term 
of supervised release.   Among the sentencing factors incorporated by section 3583(c) for 
a court to consider in determining whether to impose a term of supervised release is the 
need “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B).  
But the factor of “punishment” as a basis for determining the length of a sentence set 
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) is not incorporated as a factor for a court to take into 
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account when determining whether to impose a term of supervised release.  
Consequently, as the Supreme Court set forth in Tapia v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2382, 
2388 (2011), “a court may not
 In view of the clear law we must ascertain why the District Court imposed the 
term of supervised release.  Our task is hardly difficult.  The District Court was aware 
that because the Florida court in sentencing Lopez-Alfaro did not impose any type of 
supervision on him to follow his release from custody it was not possible to use a 
summary procedure for punishment when he illegally returned to this country.  The Court 
quite reasonably recognized that Lopez-Alfaro again might return to the country illegally 
after being removed and it sought to ensure that he could be punished for so reentering if 
he did so without the initiation of a new plenary criminal proceeding.  It therefore 
indicated that it was imposing a term of supervised release on his federal conviction for 
unlawful reentry because “[b]ased on the experience we had before with him, that he 
reentered the United States, I think it’s wise to impose some kind of supervision . . . .  So 
I do believe that despite the defendant’s impending deportation, that I should impose a 
maximum term of supervised release, so that if he comes back into the United States 
without authorization, he can be found in violation of supervised release.”  App. at 187-
88. 
 take account of retribution . . . when imposing a term of 
supervised release” (emphasis in original). 
 Of course, once Lopez is removed from this country the term of supervised release 
will have no meaning as far as he is concerned unless he returns to this country illegally.  
It accordingly follows that the District Court imposed the sentence strictly for reasons of 
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deterrence rather than as a punishment and therefore it was perfectly appropriate to 
provide for supervised release to follow his release from custody even if he was to be 
removed after service of his custodial term. 
 Finally we note that we are aware that the Sentencing Commission has indicated 
that while ordinarily a court should not impose a term of supervised release on a 
defendant expected to be removed from the country because if he illegally returns the 
need for adequate deterrence and protection of the public can be served by a new 
prosecution for unlawful reentry.  But the commission also has indicated that “[t]he court 
should, however, consider imposing a term of supervised release on such a defendant if 
the court determines it would provide an added measure of deterrence and protection 
based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”  U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1 app. note 5.  
The Court when it imposed the term of supervised release acted in exact conformity with 
this note. 
 The judgment of conviction and sentence of September 26, 2011, will be affirmed. 
